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Federal Taxation-Bob Jones University v. United States:
Segregated Sectarian Education and IRC Section 501(c)(3)
In Brown v. Board of EducationI the Supreme Court held that segregating
public school students on the basis of race denied them educational opportuni-
ties in contravention of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. When courts and government agencies acted to implement the Brown
directive, racially segregated private schools proliferated, especially in the
South, in an attempt to thwart desegregation efforts.2 Recognizing the serious
threat that the advent of segregated private schools posed to the Brown man-
date, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) eliminated one incentive to their es-
tablishment by adopting a policy of denying tax-exempt status 3 to private
schools that practice racial discrimination.
4
The policy gained judicial approval in Green v. Connally,5 in which the
district court held that denial of tax-exempt status to a segregated private
school was a valid means of furthering the government's compelling interest in
discouraging such practices. In Green, however, the court did not address "the
hypothetical inquiry whether tax-exempt or tax-deduction status may be avail-
able to a religious school that practices acts of racial restriction because of the
requirements of religion.' 6 That inquiry poses a difficult predicament. The
court would have to examine the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of reli-
gion and equal protection of the law, and determine the proper balance of the
countervailing propositions.7 The result necessarily would protect one in der-
ogation of the other.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-
1967, at 70-76 (1967) (documenting the growth in the number of segregated private schools with
the increased pressure to effect Brown). See also Comment, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated
Private Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 922, 924-25 (1968) ("The establishment of these schools was
not due to a sudden awakening to a need for quality private education." Rather, the schools
represented concerted efforts to resegregate education.).
3. For an explanation of tax-exempt status and its advantages see infra text accompanying
notes 10-18.
4. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) % 6790
(1970); IRS News Release (July 19, 1970), reprinted in 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6814
(1970). The policy was formalized in Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 and Rev. Proc. 54, 1972-2
C.B. 834 and subsequently refined in Rev. Rul. 231, 1975-1 C.B. 158 and Rev. Proc. 50, 1975-2
C.B. 587.
5. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), af'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
6. .d. at 1169.
7. If a court found that a statute did grant tax-exempt status to discriminatory religious
schools, it would then have to determine whether free exercise of the religion outweighed the
violation of the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment (assuming that indirect support of
segregation in education through the grant of tax-exempt status is government action and a viola-
tion of equal protection under Brown). The competing interests have been analyzed in Note, First
Amendment-Free Exercise Clause-Conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 381 (1982);
Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions that Discriminate on the
Basis of Race, 65 IowA L. REV. 258 (1979); and Comment, Section 1981 After Runyon v. McCrary.-
The Free Exercise Right ofPrivate Sectarian Schools to Deny Admission to Blacks on Account of
Race, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1219.
TAX ST4TUS OF SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
In Bob Jones University v. United States8 the Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to settle the inherent conflict between the constitutional grants of
freedom of religion and equal protection of the law in the context of the tax-
exempt status of segregated schools. Instead, the Court chose to defuse the
conflict by focusing on the narrower issue of statutory construction and held
that the statute defining the exemption requirements must be read in light of
the established public policy against segregation in education. Consequently,
organizations not in compliance with this policy cannot qualify for tax-exempt
status under the statute.9
This note analyzes the Supreme Court's use in Bob Jones of legislative
history and public policy to justify its interpretation of the statute granting tax-
exempt status. The note also examines the ramifications of injecting public
policy into the statutory construction process and the consequences of vesting
important policy decisions in administrative agencies.
Federal revenue laws have excluded certain organizations from taxation
since 1894.10 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code currently ex-
empts from taxation all of the following entities:
[C]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition. . . , or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. .... 1
Although such tax-exemption provisions long have existed, they have pro-
duced little legislative history. Presumably, the provisions became an accepted
part of the revenue laws because they promote the social welfare "in much the
same manner as when public funds are properly expended."'12 In other words,
not taxing certain organizations accomplishes the same objectives as levying a
tax and disbursing the funds to promote a public benefit.
Several advantages accrue to organizations that qualify for tax-exempt
status. First, income generated from operations is not subject to federal in-
8. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
9. By holding that the statute did not grant tax-exempt status to discriminatory religious
schools, the Court did not have to address the constitutional conflict described in note 7, supra.
The only constitutional issue remaining was whether denial of tax-exempt status was a permissible
governmental regulation of the university's religious practices. See infra text accompanying notes
60-63.
10. The original exemption from federal taxation was the TariffAct of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28
Stat. 556 (1895), which provided that "nothing herein contained shall apply to. . .corporations,
companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes." Every revenue act since then has contained substantially the same exemption. See
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
11. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
12. Reiling, Federal Taxation What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525, 595
(1958).
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come tax.' 3 Corporate income is usually subject to tax at progressive rates
ranging from fifteen percent to forty-six percent.14 Federal tax-exempt status
may automatically qualify the organization for an exemption from state and
local taxes including income, franchise, property, and sales and use taxes. t5 In
addition, individuals and corporations may take a limited deduction for con-
tributions to organizations qualifying for exempt status under section
501(c)(3). 16 Finally, wages paid by an exempt organization are excluded from
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act' 7 and the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act.'
Bob Jones University was incorporated in 1952 as a nonprofit corporation
under the laws of South Carolina. 19 The university offers instruction to more
than 5,000 students from kindergarten through graduate school and employs a
staff in excess of 850. The university adheres to fundamentalist religious be-
liefs that control every facet of education and campus life. 20 Each course is
taught in accordance with these beliefs, and each potential student and faculty
member is screened carefully to determine whether his religious background
and beliefs conflict with the convictions of the university.
Throughout its history, the university has believed that the Bible forbids
interracial dating and marriage. To further this belief, the school denied ad-
mission to all blacks unless they were married and had been a member of the
staff for at least four years. After McCrary v. Runyon, 21 which held that pri-
vate schools could not refuse admission to blacks on the basis of race, the
13. This advantage often does not constitute as large a factor as may first appear. Most
exempt organizations are nonprofit, operating at or near the break-even point. Any income tax
liability (if a tax were imposed) would probably be minimal.
14. I.R.C. § 11 (1982).
15. This factor is significant because several state levies are not based on income. Cf. supra
note 13.
16. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). Contributions to an organization qualifying under the "testing for
public safety" category of § 501(c)(3) do not entitle the donor to a deduction. Similar provisions
in § 2055 and § 2522 permit gift and estate tax deductions for transfers to qualifying organiza-
tions. Deduction status is usually the most important advantage of tax-exempt status because it is
a valuable fund-raising edge.
17. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (FICA).
18. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (FUTA). The exemption from payroll taxes
is also a major advantage. In Bob Jones more than $490,000.00 in disputed taxes were payroll
taxes assessed after the school's tax-exempt status was revoked. See infra text accompanying notes
38-41.
19. The purpose of the university, as stated in its certificate of incorporation is as follows:
"The general nature and object of the corporation shall be to conduct an institution of learning for
the general education of youth in the essentials of culture and in the arts and sciences, giving
special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures .... "
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th
Cir. 1980), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
20. The following are two examples of the rules governing campus life: "Students are asked
to refrain from singing, playing, and as far as possible, from "tuning in" on the radio or playing on
the record player jazz, rock-and-roll, folk rock, or any other types of questionable music," Bon
JONES UNIVERSITY, STUDENT HANDBOOK 13 (1975-76). "No young man may walk with a girl on
the campus unless both of them have a legitimate reason for going in the same direction. Couples
must not invent a reason to be going the same way; they both must be going the same direction for
a definite purpose." Id. at 19.
21. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aq'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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university changed its admissions policy so that blacks no longer were ex-
cluded. The rules against interracial dating and marriage22 remained in effect,
however, in accordance with the school's belief that the Bible forbids interra-
cial dating and marriage.
Prior to 1967 the IRS did not consider a private school's racial policies
when deciding whether to grant tax-exempt status.23 The first indication that
this policy was changing came with the announcement that "exemption will be
denied. . . if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis and its in-
volvement with the state. . is such as to make the operation unconstitutional
or a violation of the laws of the United States." 24 Totally private schools not
sufficiently involved with the state would still qualify as exempt organizations
regardless of their admissions policies.
25
In Green v. Kennedy26 black Mississippi residents attacked the continued
federal support through tax exemptions27 of totally private segregated schools.
A class action was instituted to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury and the
IRS from granting favorable tax rulings to private schools in Mississippi with
racially discriminatory admissions policies. A three judge panel issued a pre-
liminary injunction based on the substantial constitutional issue raised by the
grant of tax-exemptions to discriminatory schools. 28 In the midst of this litiga-
tion, the IRS followed the lead of the court and announced that it could no
longer legally justify granting tax-exempt status to discriminatory private
schools.29 After a hearing on the merits of the case,30 the court reasoned that
22. The rules against interracial dating and marriage are clear and comprehensive:
There is to be no interracial dating.
(1) Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
(2) Students who are members of or affiliated with any organization which holds as one
of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
(3) Students who date outside of their own race will be expelled.
(4) Students who espouse, promote or encourage others to violate the University's dating
rules and regulations will be expelled.
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, STUDENT HANDBOOK 18 (1975-76).
23. Bob Jones College of Panama City, Florida, the predecessor of Bob Jones University,
received tax-exempt status from the IRS in 1942 even though, at the time, the school refused
admission to all black students. Appellee's Brief at 5, 13, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
24. IRS News Release (Aug. 2, 1967), reprinted in 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6734
(1970).
25. If a segregated school was connected with a state, the operation would violate the holding
in Brown that any state support is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19
(1958) ("State support of segregated schools through any arrangement. . . cannot be squared"
with its equal protection obligations). The IRS could not justify granting tax-exempt status to an
illegal operation.
26. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
28. Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1127. The court reasoned that the granting of tax exemptions and
deductions to discriminatory schools was indirect federal support of these institutions. Since
Brown held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited state support of these schools, indirect
federal support is not permitted under the similar equal protection clause in the fifth amendment.
29. See supra note 4.
30. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), af'dsub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971).
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the Internal Revenue Code should not be construed to frustrate the national
policy against segregation in education. To effectuate this aim the court re-
stricted tax-exempt status to organizations meeting the terms of section
501(c)(3) 31 and required that the organization comply with public policy.3
2
This interpretation obviated the need to address the constitutional questions
33
raised by a contrary reading of section 501(c)(3). Since the discriminatory pri-
vate schools violated public policy, the court permanently restrained the grant
of tax-exempt status to the organizations.
In 1970 the IRS explained to Bob Jones University its new policy con-
cerning the grant of tax-exempt status and requested proof of nondiscrimina-
tory policies. After concluding that the rules against interracial dating and
marriage34 coupled with the school's broad definition of a date35 isolated
black students from the mainstream of campus life, 3 6 the IRS proposed to
revoke Bob Jones' tax exemption. The university responded by suing to enjoin
the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status. The case culminated with the
Supreme Court holding that the courts could not grant injunctive relief before
the assessment or collection of any tax because Bob Jones could not show
irreparable harm and certainty of success on the merits.
37
On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked the university's tax-exempt status
retroactive to December 1, 1970.38 The university, seeking a final resolution of
the issue, filed payroll tax returns for the years 1970 through 197539 and imme-
diately requested a refund of the $21.00 in taxes paid with the returns. 40 The
IRS denied the request and the university brought suit in federal district court
to recover the $21.00. The IRS counterclaimed for approximately $490,000.00
in payroll taxes plus interest.4
1
The district court held that the university was an exempt organization
31. See supra text accompanying note 11.
32. This interpretation was suggested as a statutory basis for denying tax benefits to discrimi-
natory private schools in Comment, supra note 2, at 940-50. The general notion that an exempt
organization must meet a national public policy test had existed much longer. See Reiling, sura
note 12, at 529, 595.
33. See supra note 28.
34. See supra note 22.
35. Generally any association between male and female students other than incidental con-
tact is considered a date. For example, walking with a student of the opposite sex is strictly con-
trolled because this is considered an impermissible "date." See supra note 20.
36. Isolation from other students was recognized as a form of segregation and deemed unac-
ceptable in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
37. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) (applying the anti-injunction section of
the I.R.C., now codified at I.R.C. § 7421(a)).
38. Bob Jones University first was informed of the revised IRS policy in a letter dated De-
cember 1, 1970. Appellant's Brief at 202, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.
1980).
39. Revocation of tax-exempt status meant that staff salaries were no longer excluded from
FICA and FUTA coverage. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
40. By filing the payroll tax returns and paying a small portion of the disputed taxes, the
university removed the "assessment or collection of any tax" barrier to judicial review of the
revocation. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); see also text accompanying note
37.
41. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d
147 (4th Cir. 1980), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
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under section 501(c)(3) and was entitled to a refund of the unemployment
taxes.42 Unlike the earlier Green decision,43 the court employed a literal read-
ig of section 501(c)(3). It rejected the contention that an exempt organization
must comply with public policy as having no basis in the statute or the regula-
tions promulgated under the statute.44 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, upholding the denial of tax-exempt status.45 It cited with
approval the requirement imposed in Green that the operation of an exempt
organization must not be contrary to public policy and held that denial of tax-
exempt status did not violate the university's first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones and another case rais-
ing identical issues, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,46 and
affirmed the appellate courts' denial of tax-exempt status to both schools.47
The Court agreed with the IRS view that "to qualify for a tax exemption pur-
suant to section 501(c)(3), an institution must show, first, that it falls within
one of the eight categories expressly set forth in that section, and second, that
its activity is not contrary to settled public policy."48 This interpretation, the
Court said, was mandated by several considerations.
First, the Court noted that a broad reading of any statute was justified
when reliance on the literal language would defeat its plain purpose. In Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 170, Congress defined the broad category of "chari-
table contributions" as gifts to the same organizations as those listed in section
501(c)(3). 49 The Court reasoned that the use of identical language in the two
sections revealed that Congress, in section 501(c)(3), intended to confer
favorable tax benefits on section 170 charitable organizations. 50 To refine its
definition of charitable, the Court attempted to discern congressional intent in
exempting such charities. When tax exemptions first became a part of the rev-
enue laws, there existed a significant body of common law concerning charita-
ble trusts. From this fact the Court determined that Congress merely intended
to extend tax-exempt status to charities meeting the common-law standards.
At common law, only charitable uses consistent with public policy were up-
held.51 Thus, the Court reasoned that this restriction became an unwritten
part of the exemption statute.52 Since "every pronouncement of this Court
42. Id. at 907.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
44. Neither the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982), see supra text accompanying note 11,
nor the regulations, see infra note 68, expressly denies an exemption to a discriminatory educa-
tional or religious institution.
45. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), af 'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983).
46. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), afdmem., 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), aI'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983) (also a private religious school maintaining a racially discriminatory admissions
policy based on religious beliefs).
47. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2036.
48. Id. at 2025.
49. I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3) (1982).
50. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2026.
51. Id. at 2026-28.
52. Id. at 2028-29. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist's central point of disagree-
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and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national pol-
icy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education," 53
the Court refused to sustain an exemption in conflict with this policy.
54
The university argued that the imposition of a public policy requirement
in addition to the terms of section 501(c)(3) was a congressionally unauthor-
ized broadening of the statute.55 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that Congress gave the IRS extensive authority to administer the tax laws and
that the Service simply was exercising that authority to meet changed condi-
tions.56 Even if the IRS had overstepped its authority, the Court determined
that congressional inaction since the new interpretation was announced in
197057 indicated that the IRS had correctly interpreted section 501(c)(3).
Otherwise, Congress surely would have taken steps to correct the error before
allowing twelve years to pass. Thus, by not acting when it must have been
acutely aware of the issue,58 Congress was deemed to have ratified "by impli-
cation. . . the 1970 and 1971 rulings."
59
The Court concluded by holding that the denial of tax-exempt status did
not violate the university's first amendment right to free exercise of its reli-
gious beliefs.60 The free exercise right is not "an absolute prohibition against
governmental regulation of religious beliefs."'61 If the government interest
against a practice is strong enough to outweigh the intrusion, the regulation
will be permitted.62 Since the government interest against segregation was so
compelling and the invasion did not prevent the exercise of the school's reli-
gious beliefs, the Court upheld the constitutionality of denying tax-exempt sta-
tus even though the segregation was the result of a religious belief.63
By recognizing an interpretation of section 501(c)(3) that included an ad-
ditional public policy requirement, the Supreme Court foreclosed any balanc-
ing of the free exercise rights of the first amendment with the equal protection
guarantees of the fifth amendment.64 Admittedly, this interpretation was con-
sonant with the presumption in favor of a statutory construction that avoids
ment was with the broad reading of§ 501(c)(3) employed by the majority. Id. at 2040-42 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2029.
54. Id. at 2030-31.
55. Id. at 2031.
56. Id. at 2031-32.
57. Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. See supra note 4.
58. Numerous bills were introduced in Congress to overturn the IRS interpretation. See Bob
Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2033 n.25. Also, Congress had affirmatively acted to overturn a contrary
reading of § 501(c)(7). See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2033 n.26.
59. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2033.
60. Id. at 2034-35.
61. Id. at 2034.
62. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[A]ctivities of individuals, even
when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States .... ").
63. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2035. For a discussion of the constitutional issues in Bob Jones,
see Note, Constitutional Law-Religious Schools, Public Policy, and the Constitution: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1051 (1984).
64. See supra note 7.
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constitutional difficulties.65 The language of section 501(c)(3), however, is
clear; the consequences of injecting public policy into statutory construction
and vesting the policy decision in an administrative agency demand a closer
examination of the analysis in this case.
Neither the language of section 501(c)(3) nor the regulations promulgated
thereunder support the imposition of an additional public policy requirement
upon exempt organizations. 66 Unfortunately, the Court gave little weight to
the statutory language in adopting the revised interpretation as the correct one.
In section 501(c)(3) the word "charitable" is not used as an inclusive term for
all exempt organizations followed by a listing of examples of such organiza-
tions. Rather it was placed among seven other terms describing distinct pur-
poses for which exemptions could be granted. The IRS, in formulating its
interpretation of the statute, found this fact particularly important. 67 The reg-
ulations promulgated under section 501(c)(3) emphasize that the enumerated
categories are discrete. Treasury Regulations provide a separate definition for
each exempt purpose,68 and there is no provision in the regulations imposing a
charitable requirement upon each purpose. The "charitable" category is given
a broad definition so that organizations not qualifying under other exempt
purposes may still gain exempt status.
The Court, by construing the statute to require that an exempt organiza-
tion pass a public policy test, is rewriting an old statute to make it conform to
modem conditions. The Court has refused to take this approach in the past,
stating that to do so is to impermissibly invade the province of Congress.
69
65. See the discussion of this presumption in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DISCRIMI-
NATORY RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND TAX EXEMPT STATUS 17 (1982).
66. See Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting
Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229, 238-40 (1979).
67. I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923) states:
It seems obvious that the intent must have been to use the word "charitable" in section
[501(c)(3)] in its more restricted and common meaning and not to include either reli-
gious, scientific, literary, educational, civic or social welfare organizations. Otherwise,
the word "charitable" would have been used by itself as an all-inclusive term, for in its
broadest sense it includes all of the specific purposes enumerated. That the word "chari-
table" was used in a restricted sense is also shown from its position in the section.
68. For instance, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i) (1959) provides:
The term "educational," as used in section 501(c)(3), relates to-
(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or
developing his capabilities; or
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial
to the community ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(ii) (1959) gives examples of exempt educational organizations:
An organization, such as a primary or secondary school, a college, or a professional or
trade school, which has a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a regu-
larly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place where the educational activities
are regularly carried on.
69. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). Explaining the Court's
reason for not allowing recovery for loss of society under the Death on the High Seas Act even
though recovery would have been allowed if the wrongful death had occured in territorial waters,
Justice Stevens wrote:
There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered by the
statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages
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Whether the courts will encounter other statutes rendered anachronistic by
changes in social attitudes, yet not amended by Congress to reflect the
changes, remains to be seen. By demonstrating its willingness to substitute a
revised meaning for such a statute, however, the Court now will have to con-
sider the significance of the changes when previously the issue could be dis-
missed as a matter for Congress. Such a practice puts the Court in an
unauthorized legislative position and may even encourage challenging statutes
solely on policy grounds after efforts for repeal or amendment have failed.
The Court implied that the additional public policy requirement consti-
tuted an administrative change in the law when first announced 70 by stating
that twelve years of congressional inaction since the IRS's policy change repre-
sents acquiescence and ratification.7' Here again, however, the Court engaged
in conduct it had disavowed in the past:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a fed-
eral statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not
the power to make law-for no such power can be delegated by Con-
gress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will
of Congress as expressed by statute. . . . The regulation constitutes
only a step in the administrative process. It does not, and could not,
alter the statute.
72
Supporting an administrative change in the law makes the Court vulnerable to
criticism that it is encouraging the delegation of congressional responsibility to
administrative agencies. Delegation is recognized as necessary when the sub-
stantive areas under consideration demand technical expertise. But when the
issue is a pure policy matter, such as that in Bob Jones (governmental support
of racial discrimination on religious grounds), delegation is undesirable be-
cause the decisionmaker receives little input from the public and is not ac-
countable directly to the electorate. Congress has the constitutional
responsibility to make basic decisions of policy, and the judiciary should not
support an abdication of this duty.
73
By judicially recognizing a change in the law made by an administrative
agency the Court has created additional problems. The result in Bob Jones
may influence the direction the executive branch will take to amend a law in
the future. A situation may arise in which an executive branch, frustrated by
the increasing tendency toward congressional inaction, may direct a change in
agency regulations even though the change is not authorized by the language
than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries.
Perhaps the wisdom we possess today would enable us to do a better job. . . but. . . we
have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly
enacted statute.
Id. at 625-26.
70. See supra note 4.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
72. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1935), citedin Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) and Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74-75
(1965).
73. See generally J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 78-80, 93-94 (1978).
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of the statute. In a suit challenging the change after a further period of con-
gressional inaction, a court may be forced to decide whether the inaction rati-
fied the change. This practice deprives the issue of debate by the officials
elected for the purpose.
74
The Court in Bob Jones further supported its interpretation of section
501(c)(3) by relying on a long-standing presumption against statutory con-
structions that encourage the violation of public policy. This policy was first
employed in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner75 in which the Court
disallowed the deduction of fines imposed for violating state maximum truck
weight statutes. The Court stated that the test for disallowance is "the severity
and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduc-
tion";76 the greater the frustration of an established policy the more likely the
disallowance of a deduction. In Tank Truck the frustration of the explicit state
statutory policy against overweight trucks was severe because allowing a de-
duction for the fine imposed would reduce the deterrent effect of the penalty.
Once the Court expressed its willingness to deny deductions based on
public policy, the inquiry became common in tax litigation.77 The prolifera-
tion of cases raising the public policy question did not escape the Supreme
Court's notice. In Commissioner v. Teiier7 8 the Court reiterated the need for a
close relation between the deduction and the frustration of public policy and
indicated that it would be unwilling to extend the doctrine to situations other
than those already recognized.79 Congress codified all of the recognized pub-
lic policy exceptions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,80 and the regulations
promulgated thereunder reflect the desire to limit the doctrine to the codified
provisions. s t The Senate Finance Committee indicated its similar desire:
74. Debate by elected officials ensures diverse viewpoints on every issue. In legal actions
debate is limited to specific facts and usually represents only two viewpoints. Laws, being applica-
ble to everyone, should be made in the former context to guarantee relevancy and fairness. See
generally Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Jus-
tice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
75. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
76. Id. at 35.
77. See, e.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Sullivan v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). For an analysis of the public policy doctrine in statutory
construction and its popularity at the time see Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and
Public Policy. Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108
(1962); Note, Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REv. 852
(1941); Annot., 27 A.L.R.2D 498 (1953).
78. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
79. "[I]t is only in extremely limited circumstances that the Court has countenanced excep-
tions to the general principle reflected in the Sullivan, Lilly, and Heininger decisions." Id. at 693-
94. The cases cited stand for the general principle that a deduction will be allowed if there is some
business purpose notwithstanding questions regarding the frustration of policy raised by allowing
the deduction. In Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952), a deduction was allowed for kick-
back payments made by opticians to the prescribing doctor of one-third of the retail price of the
cost of eyeglasses. In Sullivan v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) and Commissioner v. Hein-
inger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), a deduction was allowed for the cost of defending criminal charges
arising out of the taxpayers' business.
80. The exceptions are codified in I.R.C. §§ 162(c), (f), (g) (1982). These provisions disallow
the deduction of illegal bribes, payments of fines or penalties, and treble damage payments under
the antitrust laws.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1983) provides:
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"The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations
which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive."
82
Yet, in Bob Jones the Court ignored these limitations and extended the doc-
trine beyond the specific instances codified by the 1969 Act. Because the
Court used this doctrine to justify its interpretation of section 501(c)(3), the
issue may again become prominent in tax litigation, casting the IRS and the
courts in the role of public policy arbitrators. This role should be reserved
strictly for Congress.
83
In addition to the potential increase in cases demanding public policy
scrutiny and the conflict with an explicit desire to limit the public policy doc-
trine, there are fundamental questions whether the doctrine even applies to
Bob Jones. In Tank Truck and Tellier the Supreme Court held that there must
be a strong correlation between the support of the act and the frustration of the
public policy. The district court in Bob Jones found that the university's posi-
tion against interracial dating and marriage is the product of a sincere reli-
gious belief.8 4 It is likely, therefore, that the university would continue the
policies regardless of its tax status. Thus, the correlation between tax-exempt
status and segregation in this instance was significantly weaker than in Tank
Truck. Moreover, the policy violated in Bob Jones differs significantly from
that in Tank Truck. In Tank Truck the taxpayer was denied a deduction for a
penalty imposed because an explicit statute was violated. Bob Jones Univer-
sity was denied tax-exempt status not for breaking a law but for violating a
social policy. Construing the tax laws to preserve the deterrent effect of a sep-
arately enacted statute, as in Tank Truck, is quite different from construing the
tax laws as punitive statutes to effect social policy. The latter practice takes the
tax code beyond its original purposes of revenue producer and economic pol-
icy vehicle. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Lilly v. Commis-
sioner,85 in which the Court refused to deny a deduction for kickback
payments made by opticians to the prescribing doctor. The Court stated that
while the practice may be socially unacceptable it did not violate any federal
or state statutes. A more thorough consideration of the weak correlation be-
tween the school's policies and exempt status as well as the difference in fac-
tual settings might have persuaded the Court to refuse to invoke the public
policy doctrine in Bob Jones. The Court's preoccupation with the strong gov-
ernmental interest against racial discrimination, however, prevented an unbi-
ased analysis.
By vesting the choice of how to further a public policy through the use of
alternative statutory interpretations in an administrative agency, the Bob
A deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would
otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allow-
ance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public policy. See Section
162(c), (f), and (g) and the regulations thereunder.
82. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 273-75, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2027, 2311.
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 890.
85. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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Jones decision generates additional problems. If an organization violates a
policy less sharply defined than the one against racial discrimination, the IRS
should not be responsible for determining how the policy will be effected. Its
expertise is in the collection of revenue, not in making broad policy decisions.
The Bob Jones approach places a delicate decision in the hands of an agency
only indirectly answerable to the electorate. It deprives taxpayers of the op-
portunity to present their side of the issue to a legislative body before the
agency acts to enforce the policy. Reserving these matters solely for congres-
sional consideration would alleviate these concerns and is more in keeping
with the structure of our system of government.
This problem is particularly acute because public policy is constantly
changing. Bob Jones University received a favorable determination letter
from the IRS in 1942.86 Since that time, the school had operated in essentially
the same manner, yet a change in policy left the university with a large tax
deficiency. Although the university was notified before the tax deficit accrued,
the treasury regulations state that "so long as there are no substantial changes
in the organization's character, purposes, or methods of operation" 87 the or-
ganization may rely on a prior determination of its tax-exempt status. The
district court saw this as an unacceptable change in the law without the action
of Congress,8" but the Supreme Court held that the present interpretation was
always the law or that the prior interpretation was erroneous. Allowing the
tax laws to change with public policy places a tremendous burden on the tax-
payer. After Bob Jones, exempt organizations will have to anticipate shifts in
policy and adjust their operations accordingly, because they can no longer rely
on the statute as applied in the past.
The Supreme Court in Bob Jones repeatedly stressed the importance of
the government's interest in prohibiting racial discrimination. Yet by impos-
ing an additional public policy requirement on exempt organizations as an
unwritten part of section 501(c)(3), the Court more than likely has foreclosed
any congressional action toward a permanent amendment of the statute. Con-
sequently, enforcement is left to the discretion of the IRS. The Treasury De-
partment's announcement that the IRS would no longer revoke or deny tax-
exempt status to organizations that do not conform to certain policies8 9 em-
phasized the danger of a reversal of the revised policy. Only strong public
reaction9 ° kept the announced action from being implemented.9 1 An explicit
prohibition against government support of discrimination in education needs
86. See supra note 23.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(a)(2) (1960) (amended 1976 & 1982).
88. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 905.
89. Treas. Dept. News Release (Jan. 8, 1982), reprintedin 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6301 (1982). See also Taylor, U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penaltyfor Racial Bias, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1982, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
90. Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1982, at A16, col. 1; Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1982, at A14,
col. 3; Pirouetting on Civil Rights: Reagan Goes Round and Round on Tax Breaksfor Schools,
TIME, Jan. 25, 1982, at 24.
91. Treas. Dept. News Release (Jan. 18, 1982), reprinted in 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
1 6315 (1982).
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codification so that strong public reaction will not have to be relied on to po-
lice administrative enforcement of statutes involving important policy issues.
Reserving the matter for Congress would have forced such a codification in
section 501(c)(3) that could not be reversed by the executive branch through
an administrative agency.
The Supreme Court encountered one of the most controversial issues in
recent years in Bob Jones.92 The civil rights movement has come too far for
the United States government to encourage attempts by some to turn back
time to the days of racial discrimination. But justification for denying tax ex-
emptions to discriminatory organizations does not exist in the present statu-
tory framework. The Court had other alternatives. The practice of granting
exemptions to discriminatory organizations could have been reserved as a
matter for Congress. Certainly, a policy as important as the one against racial
discrimination deserves codification. Although less viable, the Court could
have declared the practice unconstitutional. 93 By choosing the most expedient
solution to the problem, the Court demonstrated that it is still willing to be the
leader in advancing *civil rights. Given the problems created in the area of
statutory construction by this leadership, the Court should consider surrender-
ing this role to Congress.
DANIEL L. JOHNSON, JR.
92. See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2030: "Few social or political issues in our history have been
more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination,
particularly in education."
93. See id at 2045 n.45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that a facially neutral statute such
as § 501(c)(3) is not government action in support of segregation and therefore not a violation of
equal protection of the law).
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